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25 July '66

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


1. I have been able to read the draft of your SIGINT Requirements Paper and the associated annex on a sort of once-over lightly basis.

2. First of all, congratulations on your courage for taking on such a monster as SIGINT and accompanying condolances because I am certain there is no way to handle anything in this area in a way which would make everyone happy.

3. The very first page of your SIGINT Requirements Paper, paragraph 1, says that the basic NSCID, DCID's, etc., are discussed in Annex _____, and in fact Annex _____ does not describe these things very completely.

4. Paragraph 6 of the basic paper says in the second sentence that enormous quantities of material must be sifted in order to obtain a very small amount of intelligence. This is not true, and you might like to give some thought to some classifications or breakdowns with SIGINT activities. Those which are directed primarily towards ~~the~~ traffic analysis, cryptological work, etc., are characterized by great sifting efforts; however, much of the ELINT effort requirements need very little sifting indeed.



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5. In paragraph 14 of your basic paper, and in later instances, you appear to skirt the use of the word ECM in describing the internal CIA needs for ELINT in support of OSA's activities. The OSA activities, of course, are significantly different in many ways from the military peripheral flights and from any military overflights which might be mounted subsequent to initiation of hostile actions. The corresponding activities on the part of OSI and OEL to assist OSA are equally unique and, I believe, provide an especially good example of CIA internal collection and analysis needs.

6. In your recommendations, paragraph d, page 44 you discuss support for the CIA Member of the DIA chaired COMOR SIGINT Working Group. COMOR is required by its charter to be responsive to USIB. Members of USIB and Committees of USIB. There is a SIGINT Committee of USIB and there is a ELINT Committee of USIB (I think). It has never been satisfactorily explained to me how the COMOR manages to set up a working group which, in effect, does much of the work which the SIGINT Committee of USIB should do. I realize there is a big policy personality question here, but it is not clear to me that the SIGINT Committee should not perform for the SIGINT field precisely

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the guidance to the collectors (including NSA) that COMOR provides to the NRO and other overflight photo collectors.

7. A chart and some additional words might be very helpful in the Annex. From my first comment, I would expect to see some description of the USIB SIGINT Committee, the ELINT Committee and other organizations, as well as NSA, but these are largely missing. I feel it is especially important, if you retain the current trend, to at least indicate in the first paragraph the specific exceptions and exclusions to NSA's broad responsibilities, i. e., those which in deference to NSCID-5 remain with the Agency.

8. I hope these comments may be useful to you, and would be happy to discuss them with you any time.

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